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RECENT STATUTES REGULATING DEBT COLLECTION,
OR NUNC, DE MINIMIS CURAT LEX
I. INTRODUCTION
Shylock. I'll have my bond: speak not against
my bond.
I have sworn an oath that I will have my bond.
Thou call'dst me dog before thou hadst a cause:
But, since I am a dog, beware my fangs:
The duke shall grant me justice.
Act 3, Scene 3
The Merchant of Venice
The lengths to which lenders of credit carry efforts to collect
claims have not recently included attempted exaction of a pound of
flesh. Yet some of the extrajudicial tactics they and their agents have
employed in collecting consumer debts go beyond request, persuasion,
and blunt demand. Some of the means include late hour and continual
phone calls to the debtor, to his friends, neighbors, and relatives,'
the sending of multitudinous or threatening letters, 2
 contact with the
debtor's employer,8
 publication of "deadbeat lists," and express or
implied threats to pursue action that cannot legally be pursued or which
the collector does not truly intend to pursue.' Other documented
tactics include visits to the debtor by a collector costumed as a public
officer, sending of documents that appear to be judicial process, use
of obscene or profane language, impersonating an attorney, and at-
tempting to collect amounts that are unquestionably not due from
the alleged debtor.° While there are reputable collection agencies that
eschew use of these methods,' approximately one-fourth of surveyed
consumer debtors who had defaulted in four major cities said they
had been subjected to one or more forms of such harassment. 8 The
1 E.g., LaSalle Extension Univ. v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424 (1934).
2 E.g., Duty v. General Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954).
8
 E.g., Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956).
4 E.g., Turner v. Brien, 184 Iowa 320, 167 N.W. 584 (1918).
E.g., Christensen v. Swedish Hosp., 59 Wash. 2d 545, 368 P.2d 897 (1962).
8 An exhaustive catalogue of cases illustrating the various tactics employed appears
in Greenfield, Coercive Collection Tactics—An Analysis of the Interests and the Remedies,
1972 Wash. U.L.Q. 1.
7 A former president of the American Collectors Association, Carl Williams, stated:
A good collection agency licensing law should be designed to raise the collection
business to a professional level and there should be nothing in that law that
should cause any person to fear such a regulatory act if he truthfully and
honestly wants to operate a collection agency on an ethical level.
American Collectors Association, Compiled Collection Agency Laws of the United States
and Canada, Introduction (1969).
8 D. Caplovitz, Debtors in Default 10-4 to 10-7 (Bureau of Applied Social Research,
Columbia University, 1971).
1274
REGUL.4TING DEBT COLLECTION
same survey indicated that the amount of harassment did not vary
according to whether the collector was an original grantor of credit,
a holder in due course of the obligation, or a collection agency.° In
another recent survey a sample of legal services attorneys were asked
to specify the consumer-client problems that occurred in their practice
"often" or "very often." Of forty-five designated consumer problems,
"debtor harassment" was the most frequent reply." Sensitivity to
the existence of debtor harassment in recent years is probably not
wholly a product of increasing awareness of consumer problems but
is also a product of the increasing credit-orientation of our economy."
As more credit is extended by merchants to consumers, the collection
of delinquent accounts becomes more of a mass operation less given to
polite and persuasive individual contact and more given to uniform
sledgehammer techniques designed to collect as many claims as pos-
sible from the many who owe." As the number of creditors for each
debtor grows, it becomes more critical for each creditor that he reach
the debtor's dwindling assets early, before there may be nothing left."
Recent restrictions on judicially enforced methods of collection such
as prejudgment garnishment1-4 might force the debt collector into a
corner from which he might attempt to extricate himself by more
intense and vigorous use of harassment techniques.'
Whatever may be the prevalence of, or the reasons for, the use of
these harassment techniques, five states" have recently passed legis-
lation specifically granting the consumer-debtor relief against their
use. The statutes vary among themselves in important particulars.
Yet they can be distinguished from all prior statutory regulation of
debt collection in that they create a right of civil action in the party
° Id, at 10-10.
10 Of 145 replies, 87% said that debtor harassment was a problem that arose either
"often" or "very often" (37% said "often," 49% "very often"). The 87% reply indicating
debtor harassment represented the most frequently noted consumer law problem, out of
the 45 designated categories. 2 Office of Economic Opportunity, Legal Services Training
Program Report for 1971-72, at 38-42 (Fall 1972) (survey of limited circulation, available
at ART Associates, Cambridge, Mass.). See also Summary of Hearings on Debt Collection
Practices, National Commission on Consumer Finance, 88 Banking L.J. 291 (1971) ;
Harassing the Debtor, Consumer Reports, Feb, 1973, at 136.
11 Total consumer credit rose from $8.338 billion in 1940 to $56.161 billion in 1960,
and then to $157.582 billion in February 1973. 59 Fed. Res. Bull. A54 (April 1973).
12 Interview with Blair Shick, Assistant Director of the National Consumer Law
Center, in Boston, Mass., March 7, 1973.
la Id. For an extensive analysis of the psychological and economic forces at play
in debt collection, see also Leff, Injury, Ignorance and Spite—The Dynamics of Coercive
Collection, 80 Yale L.J. 1 (1970). It evoked a series of replies in Symposium: 1971
A.A.L.S. Bankruptcy Round Table Papers, 33 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 667 (1972).
14 E.g., Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). See generally
McDonnell, Sniadach, The Replevin Cases and Self-Help Repossession—Due Process
Tokenism?, 14 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 437 (1973).
15 Interview with Blair Shick, Assistant Director of the National Consumer Law
Center, in Boston, Mass., March 7, 1973.
10 The states which have enacted new statutes are Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Washington, and Wisconsin. They are discussed in detail in text at notes 48-96 infra.
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against whom the practices have been used. Furthermore, under four
of the five new statutes the debtor need not show the particular
amount of damage that he suffered as the result of the prohibited
harassment'''.
 He need only show that a specifically prohibited prac-
tice was used to his detriment in order to recover a statutory dollar
amount." These new statutes stand sharply against a background com-
prised of three major schemes of debt collection regulation: traditional
tort theories of recovery, state debt collection agency licensing statutes
and trade practice acts. These regulatory schemes will be examined
briefly, and the new statutes will then be examined in detail and com-
pared with the prior forms of regulation which remain the sole forms
of regulation in the great majority of states.
IL BACKGROUND
Most of the tactics that are actually employed tend to invade
rights protected by the tort theories of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress," defamation, 2° invasion of privacy,' intentional inter-
ference with contractual relations,'" and malicious prosecution. 23
The stringent and sometimes elaborate requirements necessary for
recovery under these common law torts reflect to some degree the no-
tion that commerce among men would be unduly impeded if recovery
were more ready available, 24 that it is not the proper office of the law
17
 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 559.77 (Supp. 1972); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, § 9
(1972); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 19.16.450 (Supp. 1972) ; Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 425.304,
427.105 (Spec. Pamphlet 1973).
18
 For a detailed discussion of these remedies under the new statutes, see text at
notes 70-78 infra.
19 To be actionable the intentional conduct must be outrageous or extreme and
the damage caused must be severe. W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 12, at 56 (4th ed. 1971).
Although many states require accompanying physical injury, there is a trend toward
allowing recovery in the absence of such a showing. George v. Jordon Marsh Co.,
1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 563, 268 N.E.2d 915 (1971). Texas allows recovery for negligent
behavior. United Fin. & Thrift Corp. v. Bain, 393 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
20 Defamation allows recovery for published statements that damage the debtor's
reputation. Although the defense of truth may prevent recovery for publication of the
fact that a debt exists, it may not prevent recovery when untrue representations as to
the debtor's general credit worthiness are implied therein. Turner v. Brien, 184 Iowa 320,
167 N.W. 584 (1918). The privilege of business necessity, which protects communications
made when the information is commercially useful, may be lost if the reporting to a
credit bureau is made to coerce collection. Altoona Clay Prods., Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc., 286 F. Supp. 899 (W.D. Pa. 1968).
21 Generally, there must be an unreasonable bothering that would be highly offensive
to the reasonable man. Hoitsh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956).
22 Recovery for intentional interference requires that the defendant act with
knowledge of the contractual relation and intent and that the contractual relation
cease. Long v. Newby, 488 P.2d 719 (Alas. 1971).
23 Recovery based on malicious prosecution requires that a criminal prosecution
have been initiated by the defendant with malice and without probable cause, and that
the prosecution have terminated in favor of the plaintiff. W. Prosser, supra note 19,
§ 119, at 835.
24 "For the sake of reasonable freedom of action, in our own interest and that of
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to elevate every unpleasantry to the dignity of an actionable wrong.
The tort recovery requirements also reflect skepticism as to whether
serious harm could flow from mere harassment." These theories of
recovery were not developed with a view toward the debtor-creditor
relationship and thus do not take special note of the problems in
that area. Their force in the regulation of collection harassment or
as sources of recovery for the debtor is weak. From the debtor's
standpoint, it is safe to assume that fewer suits will be brought on
facts that publicly describe the plaintiff as a delinquent debtor than
would otherwise be brought. In addition, it has been suggested that
many debtors, if not most, do not pay because they cannot pay."
If it is true that they have not the means to pay the debt, they will
hardly have the means to pay the cost of litigating the many issues
of liability and proof of damages that these traditional theories require.
Furthermore, tort doctrines must be developed case by case, so that a
long line of cases may be needed before a truly comprehensive body of
precedent specifically relevant to debt collection practices can emerge?'
Legislatures are far better suited to the gathering of facts and the
promulgation of a comprehensive code of conduct than is a court whose
primary function is to settle the dispute before it.
Many states have comprehensive statutes requiring debt collec-
tion agencies to procure a license as a condition of doing business
within the state." Nearly all the licensing statutes list unlawful prac-
tices, or provide for an administrator to promulgate regulations govern-
ing collection agency practices." These afford the debtor some protec-
tion in almost all instances, and varying degrees of protection from
state to state. Some of the lists of prohibited practices are fairly ex-
haustive," and frequently include a catchall proscription of the use of
society, we need the privilege of being careless whether we inflict mental distress on our
neighbors." Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men, 105 F.2d 62, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
25
 There is no occasion for the law to intervene with balm for wounded feelings
in every case where a flood of billingsgate is loosed in an argumuent over a
back fence. The plaintiff must necessarily be expected and required to be hard-
ened to a certain amount of rough language, and to acts that are definitely
inconsiderate and unkind.
W. Prosser, supra note 19, § 12, at .54. The attitude that the law should, and does,
mirror the societal norm of accepted conduct is reflected in the statement: "'He
intentionally hurt my feelings' does not yet sound in tort, though it may in a more
civilized time." Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men, 105 F.2d 62, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
20
 The testimony of Ralph Nader before the National Commission on Consumer
Finance states that many, if not most, debtors fail to pay either because of some un-
expected personal mishap such as sickness or injury or because of an erroneous estimation
of their future ability to repay obligations. Summary of Hearings on Debt Collection
Practices, National Commission on Consumer Finance, 88 Banking L.J. 291, 300 (1971).
See also Shen fold, Current Trends in the Restriction of Creditors' Collection Activities,
9 Houston L. Rev. 615, 618 (1972).
27 See Comment, Debt Collection Practices: Remedies for Abuse, 10 B.C. Ind. &
Corn. L. Rev. 698, 701 (1969).
28
 For an analysis of these statutes, see id. at 702-09.
20 Id. at 704-07.
80 E.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 71-2008 (Supp. 1971).
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unethical practices or illegal means so as to prevent ingenious ways
of harassing within the letter of the law." The most frequently pre-
scribed penalty for violation of these standards is a discretionary re-
vocation of the agency's license by an administrator or board after a
discretionary investigation."
These statutes provide the harassed debtor with greater protec-
tion than the tort theories because they prohibit certain particular
practices that might not be actionable under any tort theory. For
example, contact with the debtor's employer may not be actionable
as intentional interference with contractual relations if the employer
does not discharge the debtor. Yet in some states it is a ground for
discretionary license revocation regardless of whether discharge oc-
curs." In addition, no dimage to the debtor need be shown: it is the
prohibited practice that constitutes the unlawful act. However these
statutes offer only limited protection against debtor harassment for
several reasons. Firstly, they only regulate collection agencies, defined
as persons or firms collecting claims for another or for more than
one person or firm." Hence these statutes have no effect on the ac-
tivities of credit grantors who collect their own debts, such as large
retail establishments. Secondly, the licensing statutes often delegate
the job of enforcement to a board, typically composed of collection
industry members." Such a scheme of industry self-regulation may
result in the policing only of egregious offenders, which may in turn
stave off needed, more stringent regulation." Even when action is
brought, application of the sanction, whether it be suspension or revo-
cation of the license, is discretionary." In states where commission
of a prohibited act is made a criminal offense," effectual enforcement
further depends on a district attorney bringing suit, an activity lim-
ited by law enforcement priorities and local funds. In addition, enforce-
ment depends on the availability to the enforcing agency of information
about violations. Since these statutes provide the debtor with no com-
pensation for a violation, he is not as likely to report violations as
he would be if recovery were available to him under the statutes.
Other legislative enactments may have an effect upon the conduct
31 E.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 71-2008(10) (Supp. 1971) prohibits "engaging in any un-
ethical practices or resorting to any illegal means or methods of collection."
82 E.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 71-2004 (Supp. 1971). Many states make violation of
the standard of conduct a misdemeanor. See, e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 71-2010 (Supp. 1971).
83 E.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § 576 (Supp. 1972).
34 E.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93, § 24 (1972).
35 E.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 71-2003, - 2004 (Supp. 1971).
86 See Comment, Debt Collection Practices: Remedies for Abuse, 10 B.C. Ind. &
Corn. L. Rev. 698, 707 (1969).
87 E.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 71-2004 (Supp. 1971).
88 E.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 71-2010 (Supp. 1971). Most states that do not provide
for licensing criminalize isolated types of collection behavior. See, e.g., Ind. Ann. Stat.
§ 10-4944 (Supp. 1972) (crime to make harassing and indecent phone calls); R.I. Gen.
Laws Ann. § 11-5-6 (Supp. 1972) (crime to commit assault and battery in collecting a
loan).
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of debt collection. Several states have passed deceptive trade practice
acts." Typical enactments list a number of unfair, false or misleading
sales and trade practices and provide for injunctive and other relief.
In most cases there is no specific reference to debt collection practices.
There is usually, however, a general prohibition against "[e]ngaging
in any act or practice which is unfair or deceptive to the consumer!'"
This phrase may be interpreted to include at least some debt collec-
tion harassment techniques, especially since a line of cases under the
Federal Trade Commission Act" as well as rules of the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) so provide.' Some states make the commission of
an unfair practice grounds for a private civil action for damages and
injunctive relief." Some provide for recovery of a minimum penalty
fee."
A statute that does allow recovery of a minimum penalty fee gives
the harassed debtor something unavailable under tort law, licensing
statutes and the criminal statutes regulating debt collection. Taking
a cue from section 4 of the Clayton Act," such a statute confers upon
the debtor the status of a private attorney general and provides him
the incentive to bring suit in the form of a recoverable amount without
requiring proof of actual damages. The coverage of the unfair or de-
ceptive trade practice acts is broader than the licensing statutes since
the former cover "any person,"" which is broadly defined to include
natural persons, corporations, and any legal entities, not just collection
agencies." Thus it would seem that all debt collectors are included.
However these statutes do have faults. Not all create a right to recover
in a civil action. Moreover, they all lack a list of prohibited practices
that an overzealous debt collector in particular is likely to pursue
since the acts specifically prohibited are sales and advertising practices,
and not collection practices.
Thus it is evident that, by the late 1960's, regulation of debt col-
n E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 42-115c to -115t (Supp. 1973); Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann. ch. 93A (1972 and Supp. 1972). On the, applicability of these statutes to debt
collection practices, see Shick, A Primer on the General Law Applicable to Abusive,
Unfair, and Harassing Collection Practices, 6 Clearinghouse Rev. 145, 147 (1972).
4° E.g., Idaho Code § 48-603(12) (Supp. 1972).
41 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1970).
42 Cases in the courts and before the Federal Trade Commission are collected in
Durso, Legal Representations of Massachusetts Consumers in Credit Transactions or:
An Attorney's Guide, 4 Portia L.J. (New Eng. L. Rev.) 137, 154 (1969). FTC regula-
tions on debt collection appear at 16 C.F.R. §§ 237.0-.6 (1973). One state, Massa-
chusetts, has specifically provided that the term "unfair or deceptive practice or act"
is to be given the same interpretation given it by the rules and decisions of the FTC
and the federal courts. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, § 2(c) (1972).
48 E,g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, § 9 (1972).
44 E.g., id. Other states, e.g., Maine, provide only for injunctive relief. Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 1213 (Supp. 1972).
45 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). See generally L. Schwartz, Free Enterprise and Economic
Organizations 17-20 (4th ed. 1972).
46 E.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, § 9 (1972).
47 E.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, § 1(a) (1972).
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lection consisted of a number of unrelated legal restraints, each of
which possessed virtues as well as drawbacks, and all of which taken
together fell short of a truly complete and effective system of regula-
tion. Tort law provides the harassed debtor with recovery, but its
skepticism towards claims for emotional and mental injury keeps the
standards of proof high. Such requirements as outrageous conduct,
severe injury and proof of actual damages tend to discourage suits
based on common collection harassment tactics, and to raise the cost
of the suits that are brought. Nor is there any comprehensive code of
actionable collection misbehavior. State licensing statutes present the
converse situation. They typically list a series of prohibited collection
harassment techniques in some detail. But they make no provision
for private recovery. Further, the administrative or criminal penalties
for violation depend on the existence of public funds and the exercise
of discretion by a public official or board. Even a board concerned
with vigorous enforcement may be impeded by lack of information
about violations because the harassed or threatened debtor has little
to gain by reporting a violation, since under these statutes no civil re-
covery is available. Further, these statutes usually purport to regulate
only collection agencies, defined so as not to include original grantors
of credit. The isolated criminal proscriptions, aimed in a seemingly
random fashion at particular tactics of debt collection, are similiarly
as weak as the weakest discretionary or informational link in their
chains of enforcement. Some of the recently enacted deceptive trade
practice statutes do provide for civil recovery, but like the law of torts
these statutes were not aimed primarily at abuses in the field of debt
collection, and hence do not proscribe particular abuses as do the li-
censing statutes.
III. THE RECENT LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
Recently enacted statutes that go substantially beyond the com-
prehensiveness and stringency of prior law have been enacted in five
states." These enactments were foreshadowed by two model acts, the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code (U.C.C.C.)" and the National Con-
sumer Act (N.C.A.)." Debtor harassment received treatment in the
U.C.C.C. in the form of a prohibition against "fraudulent or uncon-
scionable conduct in the collection of debts arising from" consumer
credit transactions 5' The only remedy for violation of this section is
a civil action to restrain such conduct, brought by the administrator
against a creditor or anyone acting in his behalf."
4 8 See note 64 infra.
49 Published at 5B F. Hart Sr W. Wilier, Forms and Procedures under the Uniform
Commercial Code 9-21D at 581 (1973) (Bender binder) thereinafter cited as U.C.C.C.).
50 National Consumer Act (First Final Draft, 1970) (published by the National
Consumer Law Center, Boston, Mass.) [hereinafter cited as N.C.A.].
51 U.C.C.C. § 6.111(1).
52 The U.C.C.C. provides:
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Responding to .a perceived inadequacy's in the U.C.C.C.'s treat-
ment of the debt collection practices, the draftsmen of the N.C.A.
devoted an entire article to the subject." The N.C.A. draws upon
several features of existing forms of regulation, combining them to
achieve a system decidedly more favorable to the debtor and with
decidedly more teeth in its provisions for remedy and enforcement
than existing regulation and than the U.C.C.C. The N.C.A. borrows
the list of prohibited practices from the state licensing statutes, ex-
panding it to set a higher standard of conduct." But the N.C.A. departs
from the typical collection agency licensing statute in its definition
of "persons" and in its remedial and enforcement provisions. The Act
reaches all persons engaging in debt collection," whether for others
or for themselves as original creditors; hence the N.C.A. is wider in
The Administrator may bring a civil action to restrain a creditor or a person
acting in his behalf from engaging in a course of .. .
(c) fraudulent or unconscionable conduct in the collection of debts arising
from consumer credit sales, consumer leases, or consumer loans.
U.C.C.C. § 6.111(1). The U.C.C.C. goes beyond the typical collection agency licensing
statute in that it prohibits actions of creditors as well as persons acting in their behalf,
thus achieving regulation of debt collection practices, regardless of who may be using
them. Yet it suffers the weakness of failing to specify what particular debt collection
conduct is in fact unconscionable or fraudulent. Proving that a specific act is in fact
unconscionable or fraudulent may be costly and difficult. In addition, it may take
particularly egregious conduct to excite the discretion of the administrator.
A revised version of the U.C.C.C. is before the state legislatures in 1973. Its present
form, Working Redraft No. 3, fails to make any change in the treatment of debt
collection. This failure has been criticized as a serious deficiency. Shick & Cardin,
Storm Warning: A "Revised" UCCC, 6 Clearinghouse Rev. 463 (1972).
58 N.C.A., Prefatory Note, at iv.
N.C.A. art. 7.
65 The MCA. list of prohibited practices is both detailed and stringent. It prohibits
conduct in eight categories, such as threats or coercion (N.C.A. § 7.202) and unreasonable
publication (N.C.A. § 7.204), and it lists under each category several non-exclusive examples
of specific prohibited conduct. For instance, "communication of any information relating
to a consumer's indebtedness to any employer or his agent" is prohibited as one example
of unreasonable publication. N.C.A. § 7.204(1). This blanket prohibition against all
communication with the debtor's employer goes beyond the typical state licensing statute
which often fails to mention employer contact, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6947
(West 1972 and Supp. 1973), or only limits its extent, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann, tit. 32,
§ 576 (Supp. 1972) (prohibiting only repeated and harrassing communications with the
debtor's employer). The N.C.A. also provides that "[t]he Administrator may establish
rules and regulations providing further definitions and prescribing other conduct deemed
in violation of this Part." N.C.A. § 7.209. If truly stringent standards are intended, the
method adopted by the N.C.A. seems to attain that objective. By proscribing general
types of conduct, specifying examples and further empowering an administrator to
promulgate regulations, the N.C.A. reaches conduct that the enacting body may wish
to proscribe as well as conduct that may later be deemed undesirable.
56 N.C.A. §§ 7.102-.103. The N.C.A. defines "Debt Collection" as "any action,
conduct or practice in connection with the solicitation of claims for collection or in
connection with the collection of claims, that are owed or due, or are alleged to be
owed or due, a merchant by a consumer." N.C.A. § 7.103(2). A "Debt Collector" is
defined as "any person engaging directly or indirectly in debt collection . . ." N.C.A.
§ 7.103(3).
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scope than the typical licensing statute which covers only agencies."
But the N.C.A.'s most significant departure from existing regulation
is its provisions for remedy and enforcement." Two consequences flow
from any violation: (1) the debtor's obligation on the debt ceases
because under the N.C.A. he acquires a complete defense to any claim
based on the debt;" and (2) the debtor acquires a cause of action
for compensatory damages," and in some cases for punitive damages ,I31.
against the violator. Thus the N.C.A. does not adopt the apparatus
of discretionary administrative and prosecutorial enforcement. Instead
it borrows from tort law the idea that the injured should be compen-
sated, but streamlines the requirements for recovery to a bare mini-
mum. In addition, by virtue of declaring the debt nonrecoverable for
any proven violation, the N.C.A. provides for a form of recovery by
the debtor in every case. Thus many of the costs and risks that might
have deterred a harassed debtor from bringing suit under traditional
tort theory are minimized if not eliminated. Examples are the costs of
proving that conduct was "outrageous,"2 and the cost of proving a
certain amount of damage which, in cases of persistent phone calls or
abusive language, might be evanescent and inestimable. These are costs
that a consumer-debtor in particular will be unlikely to be able to
afford. If the abused debtor proves merely that a specifically prohibited
practice was used against him, then his liability on the debt ceases.
In addition, the cause of action acquired by the debtor for compensa-
tory damages as a result of a violation does not require accompanying
physical injury, which many states still require in an action for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress."
Five states have recently taken steps in the direction marked out
by the N.C.A. by enacting similiar provisions," some providing pen-
alties more extensive than those provided for in the N.C.A." All five
of the new statutes list prohibited practices," and provide for some
67 An agency is usually defined as any person engaged in the business of collecting
for others. See, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § 571(1) (Supp. 1972).
68
 N.C.A. §§ 7.301-.303.
59 N.C.A. § 7.301.
60 N.C.A. § 7.302.
61 N.C.A. § 7.303.
02 George v. Jordon Marsh Co., 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 563, 268 N.E.2d 915 (1971).
03 W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 12, at 59 (4th ed. 1971). See, e.g., Duty v. General
Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954).
04 Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 559.55-.78 (Supp. 1972); Md. Ann. Code art. 83, § 167 (Supp.
1972) ; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93, §§ 24-28, 49, ch. 93A (1972 and Supp. 1972);
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 19.16.100-.950, 19.86.090 (Supp. 1972); Wis. Stat. Ann.
§§ 427.101-.105, 425.304 (Spec. Pamphlet 1973).
05 While the N.C.A. provides for a penalty in the form of making the debt non-
recoverable, plus granting a cause of action for compensatory and punitive damages,
the new statutes in some instances grant a right to recover a penalty fee not based on
the debt. In one case the penalty is $500. See text at notes 71-73 infra.
06 No two of the statutes proscribe all of the same practices, and they all proscribe
practices with varying degrees of specificity. Washington's list is the most highly specific
and exhaustive, and it includes a prohibition against communication in a generally
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form of civil recovery by a consumer against whom the practices have
been used." All but one of the new statutes, in conformity with the
N.C.A., protect specifically the consumer-debtor; " these same four
regulate practices by anyone engaging in the collection of a debt, and
not merely collection agencies." The exception is the Washington
statute, which protects all debtors but only proscribes actions under-
taken by collection agencies. 7°
However none of the new statutes exactly follows the N.C.A. in
its provisions for remedies, nor do any two of the statutes deal with
the question of remedies in the same way. All of the statutes except
that of Maryland provide a penalty recoverable without any need for
a showing of a particular amount of damage." The Florida statute
harassing manner. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 19.16.250 (Supp. 1972). Two of the states,
Florida and Maryland, list practices but do not have a proscription of harassment in
general. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 559.72 (Supp. 1972); Md. Ann. Code art. 83, § 167 (Supp.
1972). This approach can hamper effective regulation since some conduct not specifically
prohibited may escape the statute. Massachusetts proscribes unfair, deceptive or un-
reasonable debt collection, and then lists examples that do not purport to exhaust the
kinds of conduct prohibited. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93, § 49 (1972). This latter
approach seems to be the most efficient way of dealing with conduct that can take many
forms. It is the method suggested by N.C.A. §§ 7.201-.206.
An added flexibility in dealing with conduct not anticipated by the legislature is
achieved through regulations issued by an administrator. This is done in Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann. ch. 93, §§ 24, 28 (1972), and in N.C.A. § 7.209.
67
 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 559.77 (Supp. 1972) ; Md. Ann. Code art. 83, § 167(b) (Supp.
1972); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, §§ 9, 10 (1972 and Supp. 1972); Wash. Rev.
Code Ann. §§ 19.16.440, .450, 19.86.020, .090 (Supp. 1972); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 427.105,
425.304 (Spec. Pamphlet 1973).
68 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 559.72 (Supp. 1972); Md. Ann. Code art. 83, § 167 (Supp.
1972); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93, § 49 (1972); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 427.102 (Spec.
Pamphlet 1973).
66 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 559.72 (Supp. 1972); Md. Ann. Code art. 83, § 167 (Supp.
1972); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93, §§ 24-28, 49 (1972); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 427.103(3)
(Spec, Pamphlet 1973).
The Wisconsin provision is typical, defining a debt collector as "any person engaging,
directly or indirectly, in debt collection." Wis. Stat. Ann. § 427.103(3) (Spec. Pamphlet
1973). The forthcoming Model Consumer Credit Code, prepared by the National Con-
sumer Law Center as a revision of the National Consumer Act, seeks to avoid all
possible doubt on the question of whether original creditors are embraced by the
regulatory scheme, It defines "debt collector" as "any person engaging or aiding directly
or indirectly in enforcing claims, and includes creditors and their agents when they are
so acting." Model Consumer Credit Code § 6.102(2). Such specificity, though helpful,
seems unnecessary to avoid the confusion over whether a creditor himself is included,
at least when the proscriptions are directed at "any persons."
70 Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 19.16.100(2), (3) (Supp. 1972).
Ti Fla. Stat. Ann. § 559.77 (Supp. 1972); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, § 9 (1972);
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 19.16.440, .450, 19.86.020, .090 (Supp. 1972); Wis. Stat. Ann.
§§ 425.304, 427.105 (Spec. Pamphlet 1973).
There is ambiguity under some of the statutes as to whether a debtor who has not
suffered any tangible injury may bring an action and recover the minimum amount
that the statute provides. For example, the Massachusetts statute provides that "[a]ny
person who purchases [consumer goods or services] and thereby suffers any loss of
money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by another
person of an unfair or deceptive act or practice," including use of proscribed debt
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seems the most stringent, providing that a consumer against whom any
practice has been used may bring a civil action with recovery equal
to actual damages or five-hundred dollars, whichever is greater, plus
reasonable attorney's fees and costs. 72
 In addition, punitive damages
and equitable relief are discretionary with the court. 73 Considering the
magnitude of the penalty, it would seem that one successful suit by
collection practices, may bring an action for damages or equitable relief. Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann. ch. 93A, § 9(1) (1972). It also provides that "if the court finds for the petitioner,
recovery shall be in the amount of actual damages or twenty-five dollars, whichever is
greater .. • ." Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, § 9(3) (1972). This would seem to
mean that a debtor must show some money or property loss before he may recover
anything at all, but if he shows lass, then the minimum recovery is twenty-five dollars.
The collection practices that are specifically made unfair or deceptive are not, however,
the kind of practices that can be readily conceived of as causing loss of money or
property. Communicating the debt to other persons, communicating with the debtor
after he is represented by counsel, telephoning around the clock, or using forms that
simulate legal process are all proscribed by Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93, § 49 (1972),
and are actionable under ch. 93A, § 9. But it is unclear from the statute whether
one who was merely annoyed, inconvenienced or harassed by their use has suffered
sufficient injury to bring an action. It is very likely that since the remedy includes a
twenty-five dollar minimum recovery, the legislature contemplated that in many cases
the actual injury would be evanescent, amounting to a mere botherance, and so should
merit some compensation without proof of how much loss was caused. Of course in some
cases, as where loss of job or demotion results from employer contact, or where work
time is lost because of late night phone calls, there will be no problem of showing that
the debtor is an injured party within the meaning of the statute.
Similar ambiguity is encountered in Wis. Stat. Ann. § 427.105 (Spec. Pamphlet
1973), which provides that "[a] person injured by violation of this chapter may recover
actual damages and the penalty provided in § 425.304 . . . ." Wis. Stat. Ann. § 425.304
(Spec. Pamphlet 1973) provides that a person "who commits a violation to which this
section applies is liable to the customer" in the amounts provided, including a penalty
fee of twice the finance charge. In this statute there is no requirement of property loss,
and the legislature seems to have clearly intended that the fee recoverable be a penalty,
regardless of the actual amount of damages. Yet since the party recovering must be a
"person injured," the ambiguity remains.
The Florida statute is free from such ambiguity, providing that a debtor may
bring an action against a person violating the section, and that upon adjudication adverse
to the defendant collector there shall be liability for the penalty fee. Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 559.77 (Supp. 1972). Similarly the Washington statute provides that if a licensee
commits one of the practices that are prohibited then the stipulated penalty ensues.
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 19.16.450 (Supp. 1972). If the purpose of these statutes is to
minimize the commission of certain practices, then these latter provisions are certainly
the better examples of draftsmanship. A violation should trigger a recoverable penalty
fee independent of any damage because only then will these annoying, but not always
severely damaging, tactics fail into disuse.
72 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 559.77 (Supp. 1972). There is some evidence that many, if
not most, debtors do not pay on time because they are unable to. See note 26 supra.
If there is any truth to this contention, it is important to the effectiveness of a regulatory
scheme based primarily on private suits that the private plaintiff have the wherewithal
to set the regulatory force in . motion and keep it in motion. A provision granting
reasonable attorney's fees provides such wherewithal. It also adds to the force of the
penalty that the creditor must pay. For example, the Massachusetts minimum penalty
of twenty-five dollars may be small in comparison to the attorney's fees that a guilty
creditor must disgorge.
73 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 559.77 (Supp. 1972).
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a debtor under the Florida statute would have a considerable effect
on the zeal of an errant collector defendant.
Under the Massachusetts scheme the greater of actual damages
or twenty-five dollars is recoverable in addition to reasonable attorney's
fees.' The Wisconsin statute allows the harassed debtor recovery of
actual damages in addition to twice the finance charge, provided that
such amount be not less than one-hundred nor greater than a thousand
dollars." The Washington statute provides that commission of a pro-
hibited practice causes the finance charge to become non-recoverable
and creates liability for actual damages and reasonable attorney's
fees." An award of up to treble damages is discretionary with the
court." Of the five states only Maryland provides no minimum amount
of recovery. Instead, under that statute, recovery is allowed of actual
damages proximately caused by violation. Damages include, but are
not limited to, compensation for emotional distress and mental anguish
with or without accompanying physical injury." Generally, then, these
statutes are more favorable to the consumer-debtor than even the
ambitious National Consumer Act.
The manner of placement of the debtor harassment provisions in
the state code may be a source of confusion in two of the states. Al-
though the enactments in three of the states" describe both violations
and remedies in a single self-contained location in the code, two of the
states weave the debt collection provisions into statutory provisions
74 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, § 9(3) (1972). The same section provides that
in case of willful or knowing violations recovery shall be up to three but not less than
two times such amount. Class actions may be brought pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann. ch. 93A, § 9(2) (1972).
75 Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 425.304, 427.105 (Spec. Pamphlet 1973). The sections are
ambiguous as to whether "such amount" means the finance charge, twice the finance
charge, or the actual damages and twice the finance charge. Since it is reasonable to
assume that the legislature intended one-hundred and a thousand dollars as the para-
meters of total recovery, perhaps it means the latter.
76 Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 19.16.440, .450, 19.86.090 (Supp. 1972).
77 Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 19.86.090 (Supp. 1972).
79 Md. Ann. Code art. 83, § 167(b) (Supp. 1972). Although the requirement of
proof of damages is clear under the Maryland statute, it is unclear whether the damages
need be severe, as is the case under tort recovery theories. The legislature clearly
eliminated the requirement of accompanying physical injury, but nothing is said regarding
the requisite severity of injury compensible under the statute. Arguably the legislature
intended to allow recovery for less severe mental or emotional injury since several of
the prohibited practices might reasonably be expected to result only in annoyance. For
example, communication of unusual frequency or at unusual hours in an abusive or
harassing manner is prohibited. Md. Ann. Code art. 83, § 167(a)(6) (Supp. 1972).
This prohibition would be somewhat hollow if the debtor could not recover under the
statute unless the injury were severe or extreme. Of course it is difficult to speculate on
the monetary value of the loss suffered in climbing out of bed to speak to one's creditor
several times during the night. That is why the more effectively drafted statutes are
those that stipulate a minimum recovery sufficient to make suit worthwhile to the debtor,
and liability painful to the creditor.
79 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 559.55-.78 (Supp. 1972); Md. Ann. Code art. 83, § 167 (Supp.
1972); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 427.101-.105, 425.304 (Spec. Pamphlet 1973).
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for unfair and deceptive trade practices. 8° For example, Washington
lists an exhaustive number of practices in its licensing statute, and
then declares that the commission of any prohibited act or practice
is "an unfair act or practice or unfair method of competition in the
conduct of trade or commerce for the purpose of the application of
the Consumer Protection Act."" The Consumer Protection Act in
turn prescribes penalties for the commission of any such unfair act
or practice. 83
 The Massachusetts scheme is similar but more confus-
ing. Unlawful debt collection practices in that state may be defined
in any of three places. First, the deceptive trade practice provisions
incorporate, as unfair or deceptive practices or acts, conduct so de-
fined by the FTC;83
 which has by decision and rule included several
debt collection practices in the definition." Second, all violations of
the licensing regulations issued by the Commissioner of Banks to
govern collection agencies are declared unfair or deceptive practices
or acts." Third, a separate statutory provision covering any consumer
"creditor or assignee" thereof lists prohibited practices and declares
them to be unfair or deceptive practices or acts. 86 All of these prac-
tices are then remediable under a single chapter." Furthermore, there
is some doubt whether the separate statutory list of practices that
refers to "creditors" and "assignees" refers to collection agencies, 88
80 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93, §§ 24-28, 49, ch. 93A, § 9 (1972); Wash. Rev.
Code Ann. §§ 19.16.100-.950, 19.86.090 (Supp. 1972).
81 Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 19.16.440 (Supp. 1972).
82
 Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 19.86.090 (Supp. 1972).
83 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, § 2(c) (1972).
84
 See Durso, Legal Representation of Massachusetts Consumers in Credit Trans-
actions or: An Attorney's Guide, 4 Portia L.J. (New Eng. L. Rev.) 137, 154 (1969)
(collecting cases). See also 16 C.F.R. §§ 237.0-.6 (1973).
88
 Mass, Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93, § 28 (1972) (empowering promulgation of regu-
lations governing collection agencies).
80
 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93, 49 (1972).
87 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, § 9 (1972). This triple source of violations—
federal law, state regulations and statutorily listed practices—provides for a broad source
of standards. Regulations promulgated by an administrator provide for flexibility in
dealing with practices that did not occur to the legislative draftsman of the statute or
that only became a problem after the passage of the statute. Yet regulations are not
always readily available to the practitioner and there is an interest in simplifying the
structure of the statutory treatment of this single area of the law. The Massachusetts
scheme, by covering collection agencies in one part and remedies in an entirely different
part does not serve this interest as well as it could by collecting all prohibitions of debt
collection practices in a single place. As noted, this is done in other statutes such as the
Florida statute, Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 559.55-.78 (Supp. 1972).
88 The regulations promulgated pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93, § 24
(1972) set a higher standard for collection agencies, proscribing, for example, the col-
lection of certain fees from the debtor, Mass. Banking Regs., No. 12, and setting the
form of communication with the debtor which an agency must use, Mass. Banking Regs.
No. 15. Setting a higher standard for collection agencies, as opposed to creditors them-
selves, may be warranted since agencies will be more aware of a special standard than
small creditors. Original creditors who do not do a great volume of credit business
might more readily fall into mistaken violations of regulations of which they are un-
aware. Of course retail establishments that do a large credit business are as likely to be
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but in effect there may be little consequence whatever the answer
since the Commissioner of Banks' regulations specifically aimed at
collection agencies are similar to the statute governing creditors and
assignees" and since violation of either has exactly the same conse-
quences for the violator as an unfair or deceptive practice or act."
While the new statutes represent a definite step toward broader
and stronger regulation of debt collection, it is quite possible that they
also represent a step in the direction of overregulation. One of the
statutes has been criticized as overly harsh to the creditor and his
agents.' The penalties and-proscriptions of some of the recent statutes
do seem to be harsh. Since the statutes place initiation of the regulatory
action in the hands of private parties, the element of informed dis-
cretionary restraint is missing. This has the virtue of ensuring more
thorough regulation, yet also has the vice of permitting penalty recov-
eries in cases where informed administration might justifiably withhold
action. In resolving these conflicting considerations in favor of the
former alternative, these statutes may well clear the way for harsh
penalization of insignificant and good faith violations. For example,
in Florida, disclosure of the fact of a disputed debt by a collector
who neglected also to disclose that it was disputed might cause lia-
bility for five-hundred dollars, costs, and attorney's fees." Since four
of the new statutes extend their prohibitions beyond collection agencies
to include all persons," they suggest an even more extreme example.
The prohibitions would seem to cover acts by small businessmen such
as the corner grocer and conceivably even the newspaper delivery
boy. Since collection of delinquent accounts may • not be a large part
of their business, these people are not very likely to be aware of the
statutes. Consequently, the danger of subjecting them to penalties for
inadvertent violations is present.
It is submitted that some aspects of the new statutes may be
unfavorable from the debtor's point of view as well. Under the new
statutes the only avenues left open to the collector seem to be polite
persuasion, firm demand, and judicial suit. This last avenue, possibly
aware of standards as collection agencies and so perhaps should be subject to the more
comprehensive and stringent standards as well. However, the problem of defining an
appropriately large volume of credit business to subject a retailer to such standards
detracts from the feasibility of such an approach.
00 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93, § 49 (1972). Winter & Russell, Consumer Protec-
tion, 17 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law § 9.9, at 211 (1971), states that the section, in including
assignees of creditors, "may well mean that it encompasses any third party collecting a
debt for the creditor, including collection agencies." However, there is ambiguity, since
some collection agencies are not technically assignees, and clear inclusion of anyone col-
lecting or attempting to collect a debt would have been preferable.
99 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, § 9 (1972).
01 Eisenberg & Howard, Warning from Wisconsin: New Regulatory Laws for Col-
lection of Consumer Debts, 77 Corn. L.J. 246 (1972), criticizes the new Wisconsin statute,
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 427. 101-.105 (Spec. Pamphlet 1973), calling the penalties harsh.
92 Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 559.72(6), .77 (Supp. 1972).
98 Sec note 69 supra and accompanying text.
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the only realistic one, might be a worse plight for the debtor than
subjection to a few of the unpleasant tactics outlawed in the name of
his welfare. In an instance of possible overregulation, a Massachusetts
rule forbids any communication by a collection agency with the debtor
himself, once he is represented by counsel of known whereabouts,
unless counsel instructs otherwise." Although this prohibition avoids
questions of obscenity or abusiveness, thereby simplifying administra-
tion and enforcement, it may not represent a desirable balance of all
the considerations present. Personal communication between the debtor
and creditor may have the salutary effect of fostering an exchange
of information leading to a mutually satisfactory solution to the
debt-problem itself. Perhaps a better compromise between the inter-
ests of shielding the debtor from harassing communication and foster-
ing fruitful communication would be achieved by a prohibition of all
contact with the debtor if the debtor or his attorney so instruct the
creditor, instead of the existing prohibition that governs unless the
attorney instructs otherwise. Under such a rule at least the collector
would have notice of the restriction on contact. Communication with
the debtor after such an instruction could more readily be seen as
harassment than any communication in the absence of instruction,
as is the case under the existing rule.
In addition the price that collectors must pay in curtailing their
self-help may be fewer debts collected and hence a higher price for
credit itself, or for the goods sold on credit. Yet just as the public
seems to be willing to pay a price to clean up the environment,"
perhaps it is willing to pay a price to eliminate the bill collector's
harassing conduct. The advantages of the new statutes hopefully out-
weigh any price paid in the form of driving collectors to court, un-
fairly catching some violators who are unaware of the statutory
standards or raising the price of credit and credit commodities. Under
the new statutes it is more likely than ever before that the business
of collection will be subject to strict and effective standard-enforcement.
The system of conferring the status of "private attorney general" on
the abused debtor seems more likely than any prior system of regula-
tion to result in effective enforcement of the required standards. The
extension of regulation beyond collection agencies to include all col-
lectors may tend both to raise the standard of conduct of collection
in general, and to drive the collection activity into the hands of people
who are aware of the standards and the penalties—people who are
therefore more likely to conform." A retail businessman unfamiliar
with the prohibitions might be convinced that it is cheaper to delegate
collection work to a professional collector after being penalized for
a violation. The long term result of such migration of collection work
94 Mass. Banking Begs., No. 9.
95 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970), dealing with air pollution control.
96 These observations were suggested in an interview with Blair Shick, Assistant
Director of the National Consumer Law Center, in Boston, Mass., March 7, 1973.
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into the hands of those who are aware of the regulations may well be
the raising of overall standards.
CONCLUSION
One author, Professor Leff," has compared two situations: one
where the debtor and creditor are two merchants, and another where
they are consumer and merchant. The former situation, that of the
merchant-merchant debt, is typically solved with little friction or un-
pleasantness, according to Leff. But the unpaid consumer-debt charac-
teristically provokes a rising crescendo of abuse, threat and harass-
ment. Part of the explanation Leff advances for this contrast is the
information and knowledge the merchant-creditor possesses about his
fellow merchant who owes him money. According to Leff, the com-
munity of merchants is usually small and familiar compared to the
number of consumers that do business with one merchant. As a result
the reason a given merchant cannot pay is quickly evident to his
merchant creditor. And, hypothesizes Leff, merchants are therefore
more prone to make allowances and achieve mutually satisfactory
solutions to their debt problems. Even if merchants were prone to
harass or pressure fellow merchants they would not be likely to do
so if they knew that the debtor was, at least for the time being, simply
unable to pay.
Yet, Leff continues, there are so many consumer-debtors for even
one merchant and the transactions that created the debt in the first
place are characteristically so faceless that information about the
debtor's ability to pay an overdue obligation is lacking. To get such
information about each consumer-debtor a merchant would incur
considerable trouble and expense. In such a situation, says that author,
it might be cheaper indeed for a bill collector, to short circuit the
informational gap by using stern and sometimes abusive measures.
A ream of duplicate threatening letters is cheaper than an individualized
careful appointment with each anonymous consumer-debtor.
As a remedy for this lack of mutual information and understand-
ing, Leff suggests a "conversation pit,"° 8 an officially funded gathering
place where debtors and creditors or their respective agents might
exchange information and seek informed solutions. The present new
statutes are not nearly so ambitious, but they may indirectly achieve
a similar result. By making harassment more costly, through the use
of the prescribed penalties, the new statutes may make the civil and
mutually informative approach correspondingly less expensive. In fact,
being polite may be the most economical way to collect a debt under
the new statutes, cheaper than going to court because of the legal
97 Leff, Injury, Ignorance and Spite—The Dynamics of Coercive Collection, 80
Yale L.'. 1, 20-26 (1970). This analysis does not rest on any observed data, and so may
be distorted. However his comparisons do seem logical, and to that extent are useful.
98 Id. at 43.
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costs and the risk of losing, and cheaper than harassment because of
the potential penalties. If the new statutes do succeed not only in
tempering abuse but in increasing communication between debtors
and creditors, they will have accomplished more than their object.
JOHN M. CONNOLLY
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